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1 Introduction
The benefits and losses associated with different climate change scenarios have been
widely discussed. The Stern (2006) warns that if we continue on a path of ‘business
as usual’ there is a risk of consequences such as a permanent loss of more than 5% of
global per-capita consumption,1 worldwide deaths from malnutrition and heat stress
and the spreading of diseases such as malaria and dengue fever. It also claims that
there is a risk that 200 million more people could become permanently displaced
by the middle of the century, and 15–40% of species could face extinction.2 If these
consequences materialise, they will obviously be the source of great harm. In this
paper however I wish to draw attention to a less obvious, and thus largely neglected,
source of climate-related harm. This is the harm that comes from risk itself, where
I understand ‘risk’ as the probability of some adverse event which may or may not
occur. That is, I wish to examine the harm that comes from the mere probability
of adverse climate events (where strictly speaking, it may be the awareness of this
probability, or an effect of this probability, which causes the harm).3 I will argue that
risk in this sense decreases wellbeing, apart from the adverse consequences that are
the subjects of that risk.
1The review also claims that there may be greater risks to the climate from dynamic feedbacks
and from heightened climate sensitivity. If these are included, they estimate the total cost to be
around 20% of current per-capita consumption, now and forever. See p. 164 for a summary of these
conclusions.
2See p. 56 of the Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/
Part_II_Introduction_group.pdf.
3Of course I do not mean that it is the number which causes the harm, but the features of the world
represented by this number.
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It is important to draw attention to the harm that comes from risk itself (i.e.
the harm that comes from the probability of some adverse event), because when
decision-makers become aware of a risk to the environment or human, animal or
plant health, the question of appropriate protective measures arises. In order to
select the most appropriate course of action, decision-makers must obtain the most
complete evaluation possible of the consequences of different courses of action. In
order to obtain the most complete evaluation possible, we must compare all the
foreseeable positive and negative consequences of the proposed actions or inaction.
According to the European Commission, if we are to properly manage climate risks,
an examination of these pros and cons cannot be reduced to an economic cost–
benefit analysis.4 The relevant consequences are wider in scope and include non-
economic considerations. Importantly, the Commission affirms that “requirements
linked to the protection of public health should undoubtedly be given greater
weight than economic considerations” (Communication from the Commission on the
Precautionary Principle, p. 20). Given the Commission’s stipulation that we should
prioritize public health when managing climate risks, any harm to wellbeing that is
caused by risk itself should be included in the analysis of the positive and negative
consequences of the envisaged actions. At present however, this disvalue is a largely
neglected source of climate-related harm.
In this paper I do not suggest an answer about what ought to be done all things
considered with regard to climate risks. My argument is contained to establishing
the claim that placing people at risk of adverse climate events thereby decreases
their wellbeing. As the role that this harm will play in determining what ought to
be done depends on the theory of ethics accepted, it is beyond the scope of this
paper to take a stand on the issue. However, if my argument is accepted, this largely
unacknowledged source of harm should be a determinant of what we ought to do
all things considered.5 Consequently, the claim that the mere probability of adverse
climate events decreases our wellbeing has implications beyond those addressed in
this paper.
In the next Section I outline the three main theories of wellbeing and discuss
the challenges met by each theory. Section 3 will then demonstrate that the mere
probability of adverse climate events decreases wellbeing, according to each of
the three theories of wellbeing. I conclude that this harm should be included in
evaluations of different courses of action responding to climate change.
4According to the European Commission, the proper management of risks also requires pro-
portionality, non-discrimination, consistency and the examination of scientific developments. See
Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle Brussels, 02.02.2000 COM
(2000) 1, at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf.
5For instance, according to utilitarianism, an action ought to be performed if and only if the surplus
of good consequences over bad ones is at least as great as that of all alternative actions. The harm
created by risk itself will thus help to determine, along with other good and bad consequences, what
ought to be done. According to other ethical theories however, it is necessary to also consider issues
related to duties, justice or human rights before one can decide on a specific course of action. This
is not to say that such theories deny the importance of calculating costs and benefits. The claim that
risk itself creates harm may still matter to the conclusion about what we ought to do according to
such theories. But this harm may have less influence on the conclusion about what ought to be done
all things considered than in utilitarianism. Importantly however, justice may require that we do our
best to ensure that future people have a certain level of wellbeing, and thus the claim argued for in
this paper may be relevant in other ways to such ethical theories.
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2 Wellbeing
The study of wellbeing is a study of those things that make a life go better. It
amounts to the notion of how well a person’s life is going for that person (Crisp
2006). Following Scanlon (1998), Parfit (1984), Sumner (1996) and Griffin (1986), I
will distinguish three main theories of wellbeing. I shall call them experiential theories,
objective goods theories and desire-satisfaction theories.
Proponents of experiential accounts of wellbeing claim that one’s wellbeing is
constituted by the quality of one’s experiences. Experiences are generally considered
to be good (and thus contribute to one’s wellbeing) if they are pleasurable, enjoyable
or in some way desirable.6 This allows two agents whose external conditions are the
same, but who have different experiences of these conditions, to differ in their levels
of wellbeing. As an agent has privileged access to the quality of her own experiences,
and as it seems likely that she will assess her own wellbeing in terms of how she
experiences her life, experiential accounts of wellbeing are likely to give a measure of
wellbeing that converges with an agent’s own report of the standard of her wellbeing.
If we take an agent to have some authority on the subject of her own wellbeing, as for
instance Campbell seems to, in his claim that “people are able to describe the quality
of their own lives. . . with a kind of direct validity that more objective measures do not
have,” (1981, p. 12) then the convergence of these assessments may be considered a
virtue of experiential theories of wellbeing.
There is a substantial problem with an experiential account however, as it ignores
what seems to be an important contributor to our wellbeing: the actual, rather than
merely perceived, receipt of valuable things. Experiential accounts of wellbeing claim
it is only those things that enter into one’s experience which affect one’s wellbeing.
Consequently, where the experience of receiving some good and the experience
where an agent falsely believes that he receives this good are indiscernible from the
agent’s perspective, they make an equal contribution to the agent’s wellbeing. The
failure to distinguish between these circumstances seems to be a failure to account
for an important sense in which a life can go well (or badly). In Griffin’s words:
If a father wants his children to be happy, what he wants, what is valuable to
him, is a state of the world, not a state of his mind; merely to delude him into
thinking that his children flourish, therefore, does not give him what he values.
(Griffin 1986, p. 13)
Such examples demonstrate an important fact that experiential accounts of well-
being fails to capture: the actual and perceived receipt of valuable things is better for
us than the merely perceived receipt of these things. That is, at the very least, it seems
clear that if a child feigns love and respect in order to receive his father’s monetary
support, this is worse for the father than if his child genuinely cared about him.
Nozick (1974, ch. 3) also stresses the importance of factors other than our
experiences in his discussion of an ‘experience machine’ that simulates valuable
6Jeremy Bentham is perhaps the most well-known supporter of a view of this kind. He claimed that
the longer the duration of pleasure and the more intense the pleasure experienced, the better it is for
the person who experiences it. J.S. Mill adopted a more sophisticated view of this kind.
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experiences. He argues that we should not plug into such a machine if we had the
choice, as there are things that matter to us in addition to our experiences: doing
certain things, being a certain way and being in contact with reality. Plugging into
the experience machine would deprive us of such things and limit us to “a man-made
reality” (Nozick 1974, p. 43). As there appears to be a significant divide between
illusory and veridical experiences, this has led some theorists to focus instead on
certain objective goods that they claim contribute to wellbeing.
An objective goods theory states that there are certain goods that are objectively
good, and thus improve wellbeing in any life in which they are present.7 Similarly, any
life in which these goods are absent will have diminished wellbeing. It is the actual
rather than merely perceived presence of these goods in one’s life that contributes
to one’s wellbeing. That is, an objective goods theorist would claim that it is the
inherent worth of the objective goods, and not merely one’s experience of them,
which makes one’s life go better. Examples of such goods might include health,
enjoyment, accomplishment and autonomy.8
In order for the idea that there are objective goods to be plausible, such goods will
have to be kept at the most general level. Given the diverse range of apparently good
or worthwhile lives, a list of goods specific to one of these lives could not be shared
by others with a vastly different lifestyle. Those goods that are essential components
of an artist’s wellbeing might not be components of an athlete’s wellbeing. Moreover,
while goods such as health, enjoyment, accomplishment and autonomy may be
general enough to contribute to most people’s wellbeing, there may still be some
exceptions. Consider for instance the decidophobic9 who fears autonomy. It is at
least arguable that having autonomy will not be valuable for such an agent.10 At the
most then, we can claim that goods such as health, autonomy and enjoyment usually
contribute to an agent’s wellbeing.
Another objection to this theory is from those that claim that it is not independent
facts about value which explain why such goods are valuable for us, but our desires
for such goods. That is, some people believe that it is the fact that I want or prefer
something which explains why it is good or bad for me. Consider Parfit’s example,
After taking certain kinds of drug, people claim that the quality of their
sensations has not altered, but they no longer dislike these sensations. We
would regard such drugs as effective analgesics. This suggests that the badness
of a pain consists in its being disliked, and that it is not disliked because it is
bad. (Parfit 1984, p. 501)
Such examples may lead to the adoption of a desire-satisfaction account of well-
being. According to such accounts, desire satisfaction occurs when certain desired
states of affairs come true. If I desire that my grandchild goes to university, then my
desire is satisfied (and my wellbeing increased) if and only if my grandchild goes to
7For an example of one kind of objective goods theory, influenced by Aristotle, see Hurka (1993).
8See James Griffin, Wellbeing, Chapter iii) and iv) for a discussion of objective goods.
9Walter Kauffman coined this term in his Without Guilt and Justice: From Decidophobia to
Autonomy, (New York: Peter H. Wyden, Inc. 1973).
10For a defense of this view, see James Griffin, Wellbeing, Chapter 2, Sections 3 and 4.
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university.11 Desire-satisfaction theories of wellbeing thus deny there are prudential
goods which are independent of an agent’s awareness of, or desires for, the goods.12
One challenge for desire-satisfaction theorists is that there seem to be factors
responsible for contributions to our wellbeing besides the mere satisfaction of our
desires. We can see this in cases where an agent’s desires reflect her disadvantaged
circumstances. According to the present formulation of desire-satisfaction theories,
such accounts fail to take the circumstances that have given rise to one’s desires into
consideration. Sen expresses this concern about desire-satisfaction theories on the
basis of the desires that deprived or unfortunate people may have:
A person who has had a life of misfortune, with very little opportunities, and
rather little hope, may be more easily reconciled to deprivations than others
reared in more fortunate and affluent circumstances... since the hopelessly
deprived lack the courage to desire much. . . their deprivations are muted and
deadened in the scale of desire-fulfillment. (Sen 1987, p. 45–46)
It would consequently be a misguided (and morally repugnant) move to attach a
high standard of wellbeing to the deprived and unfortunate on the basis that their
meagre desires and aspirations are satisfied. While a satisfied slave may have a higher
wellbeing than a dissatisfied slave, we should not equate a satisfied slave’s wellbeing
with a satisfied master’s wellbeing. Other aspects of an agent’s circumstances may
influence the desires she forms and may affect her wellbeing in a way that is not
reflected by a measure of her desire satisfaction.
A different problem facing desire-satisfaction theories of wellbeing is a practical
one. It concerns the divergence between the enjoyment anticipated in an outcome or
state of affairs and the actual enjoyment that the outcome or state of affairs brings.
The actual enjoyment in satisfying our desires may be impossible to predict.
More sophisticated desire-satisfaction theories can avoid these difficulties by plac-
ing certain conditions on the desires whose satisfaction contributes to our wellbeing.
Some theories specify an ‘information’ requirement. An information requirement
implies that wellbeing is only increased when ‘informed’ desires are satisfied. A
desire may be considered informed if an agent possesses all the information relevant
to the object of the desire. By incorporating an information requirement, desire-
satisfaction theories of wellbeing will avoid the implication that an agent’s wellbeing
is increased through the satisfaction of her desires, if such satisfaction involves states
of affairs that were unanticipated and unwelcome. Such a requirement may also
reduce the number of cases where the desire-satisfaction theory implies that an
agent’s wellbeing is increased when her desires have arisen out of her deprived and
unfortunate circumstances. That is, information about the facts that can induce an
agent to form her desires may encourage different desires, ones that are not reflective
of one’s deprived and unfortunate circumstances.
It is also common for desire satisfaction theorists to specify a ‘rationality’ require-
ment. A rationality requirement implies that wellbeing is increased only through the
satisfaction of rational desires. A desire may be considered rational if the person
11James Griffin, Wellbeing, 14, and L.W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, 124, both give this
type of definition of desire-satisfaction.
12Many economists see people’s well-being as consisting in the satisfaction of preferences or desires.
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would desire its object, were he fully rational. What a person would desire were he
fully rational is open to debate and will depend on the standard of rationality ap-
pealed to. This standard may be either minimal, requiring no more than consistency
within one’s overall set of preferences, or more stringent, requiring that one’s desires
be capable of surviving ‘cognitive psychotherapy’ (Sumner 1996).
3 Risk and wellbeing
Now that the three major theories of wellbeing have been discussed, I will argue
that according to each of these theories, the mere risk of adverse climate events
decreases wellbeing. As above, by the ‘mere risk’ of adverse climate events, I mean
the mere probability of such events occurring, regardless of whether these events
actually occur.
We have seen that according to experiential accounts of wellbeing, one’s wellbeing
is constituted by the quality of one’s experiences. Some activities involving risks
of adverse events provide pleasurable experiences for people, such as gambling or
perhaps base jumping. The risks in such activities involve the excitement of winning,
or the adrenaline rush of free-falling. However, the risks of adverse climate events
are quite different. For instance, we saw that according to the Stern review, if we
continue on a path of ‘business as usual’, there will be a risk of a permanent loss of
more than 5% of global per-capita consumption, worldwide deaths from malnutrition
and heat stress and the spreading of diseases. In addition, while there is no consensus
on the probability of an abrupt change, scientists are concerned that disruption of the
climate system may pass critical thresholds, resulting in abrupt rather than gradual
changes and associated rapid impacts on health.13
The risks associated with climate change are not of the type which is counter-
balanced by an adrenaline rush or the anticipation of winning, as with those risks
involved in base jumping or gambling. Rather they are the type of risk which will
bring great stress and worry to those who are aware of them. The harm caused by
the risk of adverse events has been seen in cases where people have been exposed to
asbestos.14 The very awareness of the potential consequences of exposure to asbestos
has been reported to generate anxiety, fear, and panic for those who have been
exposed to it. Because the mere awareness of risk is enough to cause anxiety and
fear, high courts in the U.S. and Britain have awarded pain and suffering damages
to workers suffering from fears of developing cancer and other conditions.15 With
regard to the risks of adverse climate events, the European Commission has claimed
that the public is becoming increasingly aware of the risks to which the population
13See McMichael et al. (2004, p. 1553), Chapter 20: Global climate change in Comparative Quan-
tif ication of Health Risks: Global and Regional Burden of Disease Attributable to Selected Major
Risk Factors Vol 1, Edited by Majid Ezzati, Alan D. Lopez. Anthony Rodgers And Christopher J.L.
Murray, World Health Organization Geneva.
14Again, strictly speaking it is the awareness of the risk that causes the anxiety. The point is that being
placed at risk of some bad event can create harm apart from the realisation of that bad event.
15This conclusion was reached, for instance, in the following case: Norfolk & Western Railway
Company v. Freeman Ayers et al., 538 US 135, 155 L Ed 2d 261, 123 S Ct 1210[No. 01-963], Argued
November 6, 2002. Decided March 10, 2003. United States Supreme Court.
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and their environment are exposed.16 Not only are risks of adverse climate events
now widely publicised in the media, precautionary action is also being taken. The
government of Tuvalu, for instance, has already begun negotiating migration rights
to New Zealand as a precaution against the risks of displacement (Barnett and Adger
2003). Media attention and precautionary action raises the awareness of the risks that
one’s own generation faces, and the risks that one’s children and grandchildren face.
It is thus not just for one’s own fate that one might fear, but for one’s children’s,
and one’s grandchildren’s. Furthermore, it seems likely that as media attention and
precautionary action will only increase, future people will be even more aware of
the risks they face. The experiential theory of wellbeing thus implies that our own
wellbeing and those of future generations will be diminished as a result of this
awareness.
There is an important difference between cases where people have been exposed
to asbestos and cases where people are exposed to risks arising from climate change.
Presumably if one develops the diseases from which exposure to asbestos has placed
them at risk, any harm caused by the probability of their developing these diseases
will be replaced by the harm caused by the disease. At this point, the harm caused
by the risk of developing the diseases will cease. This is also true in the case of
climate change in the sense that the realisation of one climate-related consequence
will put an end to the harm created by the probability of that particular circumstance
occurring. However, the subjects of the risks associated with climate change are often
not mere isolated events. Many climate-related risks are probabilities of an increase
in rates or trends of some undesirable phenomena. For instance, during the twenty-
first century it is very likely (greater than 90% chance) that there will be an increase
in warm spells and heat waves over most land areas and it is likely (greater than
66% chance) that there will be an increase in Intense tropical cyclone activity.17
Given this, the occurrence of a single cyclone will not put an end to the anxiety
caused by the probability of an increase in cyclone activity. On the contrary, the
occurrence of an extreme weather event is likely to raise awareness of the increased
probability of other future weather extremes and may thus serve to make people
more attuned to, and anxious about, the heightened probability of other extreme
weather events. In this way, the realisation of an adverse climate event may lead
to an exacerbation of the psychological harm caused by the risk of adverse climate
events. Future generations may thus (in addition to being increasingly harmed by the
realisation of adverse climate events) become increasingly vulnerable to the harm
caused by the awareness of the probabilities of these events.
In summary, it is a plausible empirical claim that current and future people’s
awareness of the risks to which they are exposed may induce experiences of anxiety
and fear. It seems that unlike those cases where people have been exposed to
asbestos, there is no good reason to think that this harm will cease when adverse
16Communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle (Commission of the European
Communities, Brussels, 02.02.2000 COM (2000) 1, p. 8.
17IPCC (2007a): Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor
and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York,
NY, USA.
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climate events begin to materialise. The experiential theory of wellbeing therefore
implies that wellbeing will be diminished by the mere probability of adverse climate
events.
As pointed out in the discussion of wellbeing above, there may be things that
matter for our wellbeing beyond our immediate experiences. According to the
objective goods theory, our wellbeing is increased by the presence of certain goods,
where these goods might include health, enjoyment, accomplishment and autonomy.
According to this account of wellbeing too, it seems that the mere risk of adverse
climate events will decrease wellbeing. That is, regardless of whether consequences
such as flood, drought and disease actually occur, the mere risk of such consequences
will itself diminish the presence of objective prudential goods in people’s lives. We
can see this on two different counts. Firstly, I have claimed that if people are aware
of the risks to which they have been exposed, these risks will diminish the quality
of people’s experiences by inducing fear and anxiety. With regard to the objective
goods which contribute to a person’s wellbeing, the experience of fear and anxiety
will limit the amount of enjoyment and at least the quality of psychological health the
person can have.
Even if people aren’t aware of the risks however, the objective goods theory of
wellbeing suggests that people’s wellbeing is still reduced by being placed at risk. By
exposing future people to risks without their consent, this reduces their autonomy,
which is also often claimed to be an objective prudential good. Individual autonomy
is generally understood as the capacity to be one’s own person, to live one’s life
according to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s own and not to be directed
by considerations, desires, conditions and characteristics that are imposed externally
(Christman 2008). It may not seem immediately plausible to claim that the risks
associated with climate change reduces people’s autonomy, as we might think that
any adverse effects on someone’s autonomy must come from the actual harm that
is the subject of risk, not from the risk itself. So while we might say that exposing
people to risks of adverse climate events involves the probability of affecting people’s
autonomy, we might think that provided people are unaware of that risk, it cannot
by itself affect people’s autonomy.18
In making the case that risk (in the sense of the probability of harm) decreases
one’s autonomy, we should note that in order to be autonomous, or in order for
autonomy to have its proper value, one must have more than the capacity to live one’s
life in the way one chooses. A person must also have the freedom, or opportunity, to
exercise this capacity. That is, if I am autonomous in the sense that my desires, values
and plans are independent and authentic, but I am not free, or lack the opportunity,
to satisfy my desires and carry out my plans, then such ‘autonomy’ will be of little
value to me. This is relevant to the risks associated with climate change, because by
exposing someone to these risks (to which they have not consented) we reduce the
extent of opportunity and freedom that the person has to satisfy their desires and
carry out their plans. Their extent of opportunity and freedom is reduced because
their success at satisfying their desires and carrying out their plans becomes more
unlikely.
An analogy may help to make the point. Suppose that my ambition and plan is
to backpack through Europe. My friends, who think this is unsafe, but who know
18I thank an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
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that they will be unable to dissuade me from going, set out to prevent my leaving
on the plane I have booked. Unbeknown to me, they take various actions which
substantially reduce my chances of catching the plane and undertaking the trip I
have planned. For instance, they offer almost irresistible bribes to the taxi-driver to
persuade him to not pick me up, they steal my passport and they attempt to cause a
bomb scare at the airport. Despite the fact that such efforts would normally succeed
in thwarting my plans to catch the plane, their attempts are futile. The taxi driver is
incorruptible, they steal my Australian passport but I also have a British passport,
and they are prevented by security guards from entering the airport. It seems in this
case that despite their failure, and despite my lack of awareness of their efforts, my
friends manage to limit my autonomy by substantially reducing the chance of my
achieving my ambition and carrying out my plan. My autonomy is reduced because
despite my taking all reasonable actions in preparation for carrying out my plans,
my friends’ actions make it very unlikely that I will succeed. In this sense I am not
really free to carry out my plan. It is instead a fluke that I still manage to carry out
of my plan; my getting on the plane is a matter of luck (or my friends’ bad luck).
Another way of putting this point is to say that the outcome where I catch the plane
is not ‘robust’, where a robust outcome is one that we can confidently expect to occur
across a wide variety of situations similar to the actual situation (where my friends
and I perform the same actions). Because the extent of opportunity and freedom
I have to carry out my plan is substantially diminished, my autonomy is reduced,19
regardless of whether I am aware of this fact. Similarly, by exposing people to risks
of adverse climate events, we reduce the extent of opportunity and freedom that they
have to satisfy their desires and carry out their plans, regardless of whether they are
aware of this fact, and regardless of whether the adverse climate events materialise.
In this way, the mere probability of adverse climate events reduces autonomy.
In summary, by exposing people to risks of adverse climate events, such as disease
and displacement, we limit their enjoyment and at least their quality of psychological
health. Their autonomy is also diminished, even in the absence of their awareness
of the risks. Consequently, according to objective goods theories of wellbeing, by
exposing people to risks of adverse climate events, we thereby reduce their wellbeing.
The third theory of wellbeing discussed above claimed that our wellbeing is
comprised of desire satisfaction. We saw that the most plausible versions of this
theory attach information and rationality conditions to those desires that contribute
to wellbeing. So what would rational and informed people desire with regard to the
risks of adverse climate events?
What a fully rational and informed person would desire with regard to risks of
adverse climate events depends in part on whether he cares about his own wellbeing.
In order to ensure that a fully rational and informed person would desire to promote
his own wellbeing, the view that rationality is substantive may have to be adopted,
where substantive rationality requires people to care about certain things, rather
than merely deliberate in certain ways.20 I will not try to argue here that rationality
is substantive, but instead claim that even on a very minimalist understanding of
19Or alternatively, my freedom to exercise my autonomy is substantially reduced, and thus the value
of such ‘autonomy’ is much reduced.
20See Derek Parfit, ‘Reason and Motivation’, The Aristotelian Society, (supp. Vol. 71, 1997) for a
discussion of substantive rationality.
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the notion of rationality, it seems that most rational people do happen to care
about their own wellbeing. Without a definitive account of wellbeing, it is of course
difficult to say what future, informed, rational people who care about their wellbeing
would desire. I believe however that putting aside the specific explanation for why
the occurrence of adverse climate events diminishes our wellbeing (i.e. whether it
is through their connection with objective goods, our experiences or our desires),
any plausible theory of wellbeing must acknowledge that consequences such as
malnutrition, pollution, disease and displacement are factors that will lead to a
decrease in wellbeing. Future people who care about their wellbeing will thus want
to reduce the risks of such consequences.
In addition, it is plausible that informed, rational people think that their ex-
periences, enjoyment, health and autonomy matter to their wellbeing.21 With full
information, future people will know that the harm caused by the mere probability
of adverse climate events diminishes the quality of their experiences and also their
enjoyment, health and autonomy. They may thus desire to reduce the risks placed
on them on a second ground: that risk itself diminishes their wellbeing. In summary,
if future people care about their own wellbeing, it is likely that they will desire to
reduce their exposure to the risks of adverse climate events. These desires will not
be satisfied, and their wellbeing will thus be diminished (according to the desire-
satisfaction theory), if they are exposed to risks of adverse climate events.
Of course, in addition to the negative impacts which will arise from a current
failure to mitigate and reduce climate risks, there may be positive impacts. If we
refrain from investing in mitigation strategies which lower the risks of adverse
climate events, future people may inherit other benefits such as a better financial
system, or an improved health system. We might thus question whether informed
rational people (who care about their own wellbeing) would desire that we invest
in actions which will lower climate risks. However, unless scientists turn out to be
quite wrong about the seriousness of the expected consequences, it seems very likely
that exposing future generations to higher risks of adverse climate events will on
the whole be worse for them. It thus also seems likely that future informed rational
people caring about their own wellbeing will desire to reduce the risks of adverse
climate events.It is thus plausible to think the desires of future informed rational
people will be frustrated if we expose them to greater climate risks. Thus, as with the
experiential theory and the objective goods theory, we see that according to desire
satisfaction theories of wellbeing, the mere probability of adverse climate events can
diminish wellbeing, even if these events do not materialise.
4 Conclusion
The brief survey given above of the three main theories of wellbeing and the
discussion of risk has revealed the following: each theory implies that the risks of
adverse climate events will diminish the wellbeing of current and future generations,
21Note that I am not supposing that informed, rational people will hold a desire-satisfaction theory
of wellbeing. I am only concerned with the desires and beliefs that future informed, rational people
are likely to have. This will tell us, according to the desire-satisfaction theory, whether their desires
are likely to be frustrated and thus their wellbeing diminished.
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regardless of whether these events materialise. In particular, we saw that as the
risks associated with climate change do not involve the thrill of a gamble, but
instead risks of adverse events such as disease or displacement, the awareness of
these risks will induce unpleasant experiences. Therefore, the experiential theory of
wellbeing implies that the risks of adverse climate events will diminish wellbeing. In
addition, according to the objective goods theory of wellbeing, health, enjoyment,
accomplishment and autonomy may be objective prudential goods. We saw that
at least three of these four goods are likely to be diminished by placing people at
risk. In contrast to these two theories, desire-satisfaction theories of wellbeing claim
that when people are rational and informed, their desire-satisfaction makes its own
contribution to wellbeing. It seems likely that rational, informed people will desire
to minimise the climate risks placed on them. By putting future generations at higher
risks of adverse consequences we thus impede their desire-satisfaction and therefore
diminish their wellbeing, according to desire-satisfaction theories. According to each
of the main theories of wellbeing then, exposing people to the risks associated with
climate change will, in general, decrease their wellbeing, regardless of whether these
events materialise.
As acknowledged earlier, the realisation of adverse climate events will obviously
be the main source of climate-related harm. However, the harm that comes from the
mere probability of adverse climate events may not be insignificant, and should thus
be included when we compare the positive and negative consequences of proposed
actions. In particular, the management of risk and a decision about the appropriate
course of action should be based on the most complete evaluation possible of
the foreseeable benefits and harms of different courses of action. The diminished
wellbeing caused by the mere probability of adverse climate events should thus be
included in this evaluation. This point gains importance when considered alongside
the European Commission’s stipulation that when weighing the pros and cons of
different responses to climate risks, we should prioritise public health over economic
considerations. If public health is to be prioritised in this way, then this provides
further reason for thinking that in order to properly manage climate risks, we must
account for the loss of wellbeing brought about by risk itself.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Barnett J, Adger WN (2003) Climate dangers and atoll countries. Clim Change 61(3):321–337
Campbell A (1981) The sense of well-being in America: recent patterns and trends. McGraw-Hill,
New York
Christman J (2008) Autonomy in moral and political philosophy. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stan-
ford encyclopedia of philosophy. Available via DIALOG. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2008/entries/autonomy-moral/
Crisp R (2006) Well-Being. In: Zalta EN (ed) The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Available
via DIALOG. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2006/entries/well-being/
Griffin J (1986) Wellbeing: its meaning, measurement and importance. Clarendon, Oxford
Hurka T (1993) Perfectionism. Clarendon, Oxford
Nozick R (1974) Anarchy, state, and utopia. Basil Blackwell, Oxford
Parfit D (1984) Reasons and persons. Clarendon, Oxford
358 Climatic Change (2011) 106:347–358
Scanlon T (1998) What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Sen A (1987) On Ethics and Economics. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 131 p
Stern N (2006) Stern Review on The Economics of Climate Change (pre-publication edition).
Executive Summary. HM Treasury, London. Archived from the original on 2010-01-31.
http://www.webcitation.org/5nCeyEYJr. Retrieved 2010-10-20
Sumner LW (1996) Welfare, happiness, and ethics. Clarendon, Oxford
Reports
Communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle (Commission of the European
Communities, Brussels, 02.02.2000 COM) (2000) 1 at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/
library/pub/pub07_en.pdf
IPCC (2007a) Summary for policymakers. In: Solomon S, Qin D, Manning M, Chen Z, Marquis
M, Averyt KB, Tignor M, Miller HL (eds) Climate change 2007: the physical science basis.
Contribution of working group I to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel
on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York,
NY, USA
McMichael AJ, Campbell-Lendrum D, Kovats S, Edwards S, Wilkinson P, Wilson T, Nicholls R,
Hales S, Tanser F, Le Sueur D, Schlesinger M, Andronova N (2004) Chapter 20: global climate
change in comparative quantification of health risks: global and regional burden of disease at-
tributable to selected major risk factors. In: Ezzati M, Lopez AD, Rodgers A, Murray CJL (eds)
World health organization Geneva, vol 1. http://www.who.int/publications/cra/chapters/volume2/
1543-1650.pdf
